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THE DEATH PENALTY IN WASHINGTON: AN HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE
On May 14, 1981, Governor John D. Spellman approved new capital
punishment legislation for the State of Washington. The new statute was
enacted' in response to State v. Frampton,2 in which the Washington Supreme Court invalidated the 1977 death penalty statute, RCW chapter
10.94. 3 The 1977 statute had been enacted as the result of an initiative
approved by 67.8% of the state's voters in 1975. 4 The court based its
5
decision in Framptonon its earlier ruling in State v. Martin.

In Martin, the court held that a defendant charged with first degree
murder has the right to plead guilty and that a defendant entering a guilty
plea could not be sentenced to death under RCW chapter 10.94. As a
result, a defendant electing to go to trial faced the possible imposition of
the death penalty, while a defendant pleading guilty did not.
In Frampton, a divided court reaffirmed the Martin decision and held
RCW chapter 10.94 unconstitutional. The state had conceded that the
Martin construction invalidated the statute by placing an impermissible
burden on a capital defendant's right to a trial by jury, 6 but urged the
court to overrule Martin. In refusing to reconsider its earlier decision, the
court struck down legislation overwhelmingly supported by the people of
Washington.
This Comment follows the evolution of Washington's capital punishment law through the 1981 legislation and analyzes the two cases that
invalidated the 1977 death penalty statute. The Comment favors the reasoning behind the dissenting opinions of Martin and Frampton as more
consistent with established principles of statutory construction. The Comment concludes with a discussion of Washington's new capital punishment legislation enacted in response to the supreme court's decisions.
1. Act of May 14, 1981, ch. 138, 1981 Wash. Laws 535 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE ch.
10.95 (1981)).
2. 95Wn. 2d469, 627 P.2d 922 (1981).
3. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. ch. 10.94 (repealed 1981).
4. In the November 4, 1975 state general election, Washington voters approved Initiative Measure No. 316, 1975-76 Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 17 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§
9A.32.045-047 (1977) (repealed 1981), enacting a mandatory death penalty in all cases of aggravated first degree murder. The vote on the initiative was 662,535 for the mandatory death penalty to
296,257 against. 1977 Wash. Laws 1849. After the United States Supreme Court invalidated mandatory death penalty provisions in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 279 (1975), the Washington
Legislature revised the sentencing scheme when it enacted RCW chapter 10.94. Act of June 10,
1977, ch. 206, 1977 Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess. 744, 776-78.
5. 94 Wn. 2d 1,614 P.2d 164 (1980).
6. Consolidated Brief for Plaintiffs/Respondents at 2 n. 1, State v. Frampton, 95 Wn. 2d 469,
627 P.2d 922 (1981).
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I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Right to Plead Guilty

Washington's territorial legislature enacted the first statute recognizing
the criminal defendant's right to plead guilty to murder in 1854. 7 In 1881,
the territorial legislature enacted another statute listing the permissible
pleas, expressly including guilty pleas. 8 This latter provision remained
the governing authority until superseded in 1973 by the supreme court's
adoption of the Criminal Rules for Superior Court. 9 Under Criminal Rule
4.2(a) the only pleas acceptable at arraignment are not guilty, not guilty
by reason of insanity, or guilty. 10 The supreme court's holding in Martin
that the death penalty statute does not preclude a defendant from pleading
guilty was, therefore, consistent with longstanding Washington law.
B.

Sentencing Schemes

In contrast to the legislative development of the right to plead guilty,
the development of sentencing procedures for defendants who plead
guilty has been erratic. The original legislative scheme as enacted in 1854
provided for impaneling a sentencing jury whenever a defendant pleaded

7. Act of Apr. 28, 1854, § 87, 1854 Wash. Laws 100, 115. As later codified, this statute read:
Waiver ofjury on plea of guilty-Exception. If on the arraignment of any person, he shall plead
guilty, if the offense charged be not murder, the court shall, in their discretion, hear testimony,
and determine the amount and kind of punishment to be inflicted; but if the defendant plead
guilty to a charge of murder, a jury shall be impaneled to hear testimony, and determine the
degree of murder and punishment therefor.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.49.010 (1980) (repealed 1981) (emphasis added).
8. The original provision, relating to grand jury indictments, was amended in 1891 to include
prosecutorial informations: "There are but three pleas to the indictment or information: A plea of I. Guilty; 2. Not guilty; 3. A former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the offense charged.
which may be pleaded with or without the plea of not guilty." Act of Feb. 24, 1891, ch. 28, § 57.
1891 Wash. Laws 46, 57 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 10.40.150 (1981)) (superseded by WASH.
SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.2).

9. The Criminal Rules for Superior Court were adopted by order of the Washington Supreme
Court on April 18, 1973. 82 Wn. 2d 1114 (1973). Rules promulgated by the supreme court supersede
all prior inconsistent legislation. State v. Scott, 92 Wn. 2d 209, 212, 595 P.2d 549, 551 (1979);
WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.200 (1981). The result is less certain when a conflicting statute is enacted
after a rule is adopted, although two Washington attorney general opinions have indicated that whichever is later in time should control. 1977 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen., No. 20 (Oct. 26, 1977); 1973 Op.
Wash. Att'y Gen., No. 4 (Jan. 19, 1973).
10. Criminal Rule 4.2 supersedes the prior legislation concerning pleading, WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 10.40.150,.160,.175 (1981). WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.2 Comment.
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guilty to determine both the degree of murder and the penalty to be imposed. "1For first degree murder, the death penalty was automatic. 12
A broader provision of the 1854 law required that the jury determine
the punishment to be imposed whenever a criminal defendant was found
guilty. 13 This provision was amended in 1869 to require that the court,
rather than the jury, determine the penalty in these cases. 14 The amendment did not affect the requirement of the 1854 statute that a jury determine the degree of murder and the penalty to be imposed when a defendant pleaded guilty to murder. Nor did the amendment affect the
mandatory death penalty for first degree murder.
The sentencing scheme for first degree murder was revised three times
in the early part of this century. In 1909, the legislature made first degree
murder punishable by life imprisonment or death, in the discretion of the
court. 15 The legislature abolished the death penalty in 1913, making life
imprisonment the sole penalty. 16 The legislature reinstated the death penalty in 1919 and granted the jury the power to determine whether the penalty for first degree murder would be life imprisonment or death. 17 The
court assessed the penalty in all cases other than first degree murder. This
scheme remained unchanged for the next fifty-six years. 18
The death penalty was again abolished by the legislature in 1975.19
Later that year Washington voters approved Initiative Measure No. 316,20
imposing a mandatory death penalty for "Aggravated Murder in the First
Degree," that is, first degree murder in the presence of statutorily defined
aggravating circumstances. 2 1 A person found guilty of aggravated first
11. ActofApr. 28, 1854, §87, 1854Wash. Laws 100, 115 (codified as amended at WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 10.49.010 (1980)) (repealed 1981). See generally note 7 supra (text of WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 10.49.010 (1980)).
12. Act of Apr. 28, 1854, § 12, 1854 Wash. Laws 75, 78 (repealed 1975).
13. Act of Apr. 28, 1854, § 128, 1854 Wash. Laws 100, 121.
14. Act of Dec. 2, 1869, §258, 1869 Wash. Laws 198, 254.
15. Act of Mar. 22, 1909, ch. 249, §140, 1909 Wash. Laws 890, 930 (repealed 1975).
16. ActofMar. 22, 1913, ch. 167, §, 1913 Wash. Laws 581, 581.
17. Act of Mar. 14, 1919, ch. 112, § 1, 1919 Wash. Laws 273,274 (repealed 1975).
18. Before its repeal in 1975, the death penalty scheme enacted by the 1919 legislature had been
codified at RCW § 9.48.030.
19. Washington Criminal Code Act of 1975, ch. 260, § 9A.92.010(125), 1975 Wash. Laws 1st
Ex. Sess. 817, 862.
20. 1975-76 Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 17 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §8
9A.32.045-.047 (1977)) (repealed 1981).
21. The section on aggravating circumstances read, as amended, as follows:
(1) In a special sentencing proceeding under RCW 10.94.020, the following shall constitute
aggravating circumstances:
(a) The victim was a law enforcement officer or fire fighter and was performing his or her
official duties at the time of the killing and the victim was known or reasonably should have been
known to be such at the time of the killing.
(b) At the time of the act resulting in the death, the defendant was serving a term of imprison-
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degree murder automatically received the death penalty.2 2 In 1977, the
legislature adopted RCW chapter 10.94,23 which replaced the mandatory
sentence and detailed the procedures by which the death penalty could be

imposed.
Under RCW chapter 10.94, a defendant charged with first degree murder 24 faced the possible imposition of the death penalty whenever the prosecuting attorney filed a notice of intention to request that penalty. 25 Be-

fore filing the request, the prosecuting attorney had to have reason to
believe the crime involved at least one aggravating circumstance. 26 If the
defendant then was found guilty of first degree murder, the court con-

ment in a state correctional institution or had escaped or was on authorized or unauthorized leave
from a state correctional institution, or was in custody in a local jail and subject to commitment
to a state correctional institution.
(c) The defendant committed the murder pursuant to an agreement that the defendant receive
money or other thing of value for committing the murder.
(d) The defendant had solicited another to commit the murder and had paid or agreed to pay
such person money or other thing of value for committing the murder.
(e)The murder was of a judge, juror, witness, prosecuting attorney, a deputy prosecuting
attorney, or defense attorney because of the exercise of his or her official duty in relation to the
defendant.
(f) There was more than one victim and the said murders were part of a common scheme or
plan, or the result of a single act of the defendant.
(g) The defendant committed the murder in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate
flight from the crimes of either (i) robbery in the first or second degree, (ii) rape in the first or
second degree, (iii) burglary in the first degree, (iv) arson in the first degree, or (v) kidnaping in
which the defendant intentionally abducted another person with intent to hold the person for
ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, and the killing was committed with the reasonable
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result.
(h) The murder was committed to obstruct or hinder the investigative, research, or reporting
activities of anyone regularly employed as a newsreporter, including anyone self-employed in
such capacity.
Act of June 10, 1977, ch. 206, § 4, 1977 Wash. Laws IstEx. Sess. 774, 776 (amending WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.32.045 (1977)) (repealed 1981).
22. Initiative Measure No. 316, 1975-76 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 17, 18 (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.046 (1977)) (repealed 1981).
23. Act of June 10, 1977, ch. 206, 1977 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 774 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. ch. 10.94 (1980)) (repealed 1981). Presumably this action by the legislature was in response to the United States Supreme Court's invalidation of mandatory death penalty statutes in
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating a mandatory death penalty statute
under the eighth amendment because it did not afford the jury the opportunity to consider an individual defendant's character and record and the circumstances of the particular offense in the penalty
determination). See text accompanying notes 131-133 infra.
24. "A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when: (a) With a premeditated intent to
cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person .
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030(l) (1981).

25. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.94.010 (1980) (repealed 1981).
26. Id. See generally note 20 supra (partial text of Act of June 10, 1977, ch. 206, § 4, 1977
Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 774, 776 (amending WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.045 (1977)) (detailing the aggravating circumstances) (repealed 198 1)).
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ducted a special sentencing proceeding to determine whether to impose
the death penalty. 27
In the special proceeding, the sentencing jury determined whether aggravating circumstances were in fact present and whether there were sufficient mitigating circumstances 28 to merit leniency. If so, the death penalty was automatically imposed if, in addition, the jury unanimously
agreed that: (1) the evidence at trial established guilt with clear certainty;
and (2) there was no reasonable doubt the defendant would commit additional acts of violence constituting a continuing threat to society. 29 If the
jury found that aggravating circumstances were present, but any one of
the other remaining requisites for imposing the death penalty was not
met, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole. 30 In all first degree murder convictions in
27. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.94.020 (1980) (repealed 1981). This statute provided, in part:
(1) If notice of intention to request the death penalty has been served and filed by the prosecution in accordance with RCW 10.94.010, then a special sentencing proceeding shall be held in
the event the defendant is found guilty of murder in the first degree under RCW
9A.32.030(l)(a).
(2) If the prosecution has filed a request for the death penalty in accordance with RCW
10.94.010, and the trial jury returns a verdict of murder in the first degree under RCW
9A.32.030(1)(a), then, at such time as the verdict is returned, the trial judge shall reconvene the
same trial jury to determine in a separate special sentencing proceeding whether there are one or
more aggravating circumstances and whether there are mitigating circumstances sufficient to
merit leniency, as provided in RCW 9A.32.045 as now or hereafter amended, and to answer
special questions pursuant to subsection (10) of this section. The special sentencing proceeding
shall be held as soon as possible following the return of the jury verdict.
28. The statutory provision on mitigating circumstances was as follows:
(2) In deciding whether there are mitigating circumstances sufficient to merit leniency, the
jury may consider any relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental disturbance;
(c) The victim consented to the homicidal act;
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and the defendant's participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor;
(e) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person;
(f) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality
(wrongfulness) of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law
was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect;
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime calls for leniency.
Act of June 10, 1977, ch. 206, § 4, 1977 Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess. 774, 777 (repealed 1981).
29. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.94.020(10) (1980) (repealed 1981); see also Act of June 10,
1977, ch. 206, § 5, 1977 Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess. 774, 777 (amending WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.32.046 (1977)) (stating conditions under which the death penalty was automatic) (repealed 1981).
30. Act of June 10, 1977, ch. 206, § 3(2), 1977 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 774, 776 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.040(2) (1981)). In addition, in the event of a commuted
sentence of death, or a finding that the death penalty was unconstitutional, the sentence was life
without the possibility of release or parole. Id. § 6, 1977 Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess. at 778 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.047 (1981)) (repealed 1981).
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which the prosecuting attorney did not request the special death penalty
proceeding or if the special sentencing jury found no aggravating circum31
stances, the penalty was limited to life with the possibility of parole.
These procedures were the subject of controversy in Martin and Frampton.
II.

THE INVALIDATION OF THE 1977 DEATH PENALTY
STATUTE

A.

State v. Martin

Donald Martin was arraigned on July 3, 1979, on charges arising out of
a series of brutal crimes committed in the early spring of 1979.32 He was
prepared to plead guilty to first degree murder if the judge confirmed that
the maximum sentence upon such a plea was life with the possibility of
parole. 33 Martin argued that life with the possibility of parole was the
maximum permissible sentence because the death penalty statute that the
state sought to impose against him 34 did not provide explicitly for imposing the death penalty after a guilty plea. Therefore, he argued, the penalty
should be the same as that for any non-aggravated first degree murder
conviction.
The state asserted a right either to preclude Martin from pleading guilty
or to seek the death penalty regardless of the plea. 35 The trial judge re-

fused to accept Martin's plea on the ground that the state's right to request
36
the death penalty under RCW chapter 10.94 prevented his guilty plea.
The supreme court reversed and remanded, 37 holding: (1) a defendant
is entitled to plead guilty to first degree murder; (2) the special sentencing
procedures of RCW chapter 10.94 do not apply if a defendant pleads
guilty; and (3) the maximum sentence upon a guilty plea is life with the
possibility of parole.
31. Act of June 10, 1977, ch. 206, § 3(3), 1977 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 774, 776 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.040(3) (1981)).
32. Donald Martin was suspected of terrorizing residents of Seattle's Capitol Hill for 44 hours in
the early spring of 1979. He was accused of perpetrating crimes against twelve victims, two of whom

were brutally murdered and two severely maimed, between 1:30 a.m. on Saturday, March 31, 1979.
and 9:00 p.m. on Sunday, April 1, 1979. Lewis, A Weekend of Terror, Seattle Times, Mar. 15,

1981, at 8 (Pacific Magazine). The prosecution presented 22 charges against Martin, including two
homicides, two rapes, two attempted murders, kidnaping, assault, and armed robbery. Id.
33. 94 Wn. 2d at 3,614 P.2d at 165.
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.040 (1981) (amended 1981).
35. 94 Wn. 2d at 2-3,614 P.2d at 165.
36. Id. at 3, 614 P.2d at 165; see generally WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.94.010 (1980) (allowing prosecuting attorney 30 days from arraignment to request the death penalty) (repealed 1981).
37. 94 Wn. 2d at 9,614 P.2d at 176.
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1.

The Right to PleadGuilty

The supreme court held that all criminal defendants have the right to
plead guilty and that the state's death penalty statute did not abrogate that
right. 38 Nevertheless, the court recognized that the right is neither constitutional nor absolute. The United States Supreme Court has stated that a
criminal defendant has no constitutional right to have a guilty plea accepted, but that a state could grant the right by statute or other means. 39
Under this authority, the court in Martin, Justice Stafford writing, held
that the state had granted the right to have a guilty plea accepted by virtue
40
of Criminal Rule 4:2(a).
Justice Horowitz, joined by Chief Justice Utter, concurred. He rejected
the state's argument that RCW chapter 10.94 impliedly repealed Rule
4.2(a), since he found no inconsistency between the two. 4 1 He noted that
implied repeals are disfavored under Washington law. 42
In dissent, Justice Rosellini, joined by Justice Hicks, argued that Rule
4.2(a) did not confer the right to plead guilty to first degree murder. He
reasoned that Rule 4.2(a) merely lists permissible pleas and does not
specify circumstances under which such pleas would be accepted. 43 He
found guilty pleas prohibited in capital cases by reading RCW chapter
10.94 in conjunction with RCW § 10.01.060. 44 He stated that even if
38. Id. at3,614P.2dat 165.
39. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n. 11 (1970); see also Lynch v. Overholser, 369
U.S. 705,719 (1962) (same).
40. 94 Wn. 2d at 4, 614 P.2d at 165.
41. Id. at 13,614 P.2d at 170.
42. Id. at 13-14, 614 P.2d at 170. Justice Horowitz also rejected the state's argument that RCW
§ 10.01.060 prevents capital defendants from pleading guilty. This statute provides:
No person informed against or indicted for a crime shall be convicted thereof, unless by admitting the truth of the charge in his plea, by confession in open court, or by the verdict of a
jury, accepted and recorded by the court: Providedhowever, That except in capital cases, where
the person informed against or indicted for a crime is represented by counsel, such person may,
with the assent of the court, waive trial by jury and submit to trial by the court.
WASH. REv. CODE § 10.01.060 (1981).
In Justice Horowitz's view, RCW § 10.01.060 consisted of two parts: the first clause listing the
methods of determining guilt, the second allowing trial by the court except in capital cases. This
second provision merely limits trial options without affecting the other methods of determining guilt.
94 Wn. 2d at 14, 614 P.2d at 170. He asserted that § 10.01.060 had never been used to deny the right
to plead guilty when charged with a capital offense. Justice Horowitz said that such an interpretation
"would have the effect of enacting a new statute that is inconsistent with decades of practice in this
state." Id. at 15, 614 P.2d at 171. He cited RCW § 10.49.010, in effect in 1951 when RCW §
10.01.060 was enacted, as "implicitly anticipat[ing] the guilty pleas of murder defendants" by providing for impaneling a sentencing jury for defendants pleading guilty to murder charges. Id. at
14-15, 614 P.2d at 170; see generally note 7 supra (partial text of WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
10.49.010 (1980) (repealed 1981)).
43. 94 Wn. 2d at 28,614 P.2d at 177.
44. Id. See generally note 42 supra (text of WASH. REv. CODE § 10.01.060 (1981)).
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Rule 4.2(a) addressed the issue of when guilty pleas may be entered,
RCW chapter 10.94, as a special and later law, superseded the general
45
and earlier procedural principles of Rule 4.2(a) in capital cases.
2.

Special Sentencing UnderRCW Chapter 10.94

After upholding the defendant's right to plead guilty, the court held
that Washington's death penalty statute did not apply if the defendant
pleads guilty. 46 The court rejected the state's contention that it could imply a special sentencing procedure from the provision in RCW chapter
10.9447 that requires the jury that returned the verdict of first degree murder also to determine the sentence. 48 Instead, the court found that that
provision did not provide for impaneling a sentencing jury in the event of
a guilty plea. A special sentencing jury impaneled after a guilty plea
would be neither the "trial jury" that had returned a first degree murder
verdict nor the "same trial jury" reconvened. 49 The court decided that
the legislature had failed to anticipate that a capital defendant might plead
guilty; and, in the absence of express language, it refused to read into the
statute the omitted sentencing provision. Although the court recognized
the attractiveness of the state's proposal to imply a special sentencing procedure, it reasoned that such action would constitute "clear judicial usurpation of legislative power." 50
Justice Rosellini rejected the theory of legislative oversight. He said
that the legislature, striving to draft a law that would meet constitutional
standards, is presumed to be aware of United States and Washington Supreme Court decisions. 5 1 In light of that presumption, the legislature must
have known that it constitutionally could not permit a capital defendant to
45. Id.- see also Pannell v. Thompson, 91 Wn. 2d 591, 597, 589 P.2d 1235, 1239 (1979) (supporting the general rule that later, special legislation supersedes earlier, general legislation): Hama
Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wn. 2d 441, 447. 536 P.2d 157, 161 (1975) (same):
Knowles v. Holly, 82 Wn. 2d 694, 702, 513 P.2d 18, 23 (1973) (same).
46. 94 Wn. 2d at 3, 8, 9, 614 P.2d at 167-68.
47. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.94.020(2) (1980) (repealed 1981) see note 25 supra (text of
statute).
48. 94Wn. 2d at 7-8, 614 P.2d at 167.
49. Id. at 8, 614 P.2d at 167. This reasoning also led the court to find inapposite the cases cited
by the state in support of its argument. Those cases were decided under a provision of RCW chapter
10.49 requiring defendants on murder charges who plead guilty to submit to a jury determination of
the degree of murder and the penalty to be imposed. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.49.010 (1980)
(repealed 1981); see note 7 supra (text of statute).

50. 94 Wn. 2d at 8,614 P.2d at 168.
51. Id. at 26, 614 P.2d at 176 (dissenting opinion); see also In re Marriage of Little. 96 Wn. 2d
183, 189-90, 634 P.2d 498, 502 (1981) (legislature is presumed to be familiar with its own prior
enactments and with judicial decisions on the subject); Woodson v. State, 95 Wn. 2d 257. 262, 623
P.2d 683, 685 (1980) (same); State v. Fenner, 89 Wn. 2d 56, 62, 569 P.2d 67, 70 (1977) (same).
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escape the possible imposition of the death penalty by pleading guilty. 52
Nothing in RCW chapter 10.94 restricted the prosecuting attorney's hight
to request the death penalty to cases in which a defendant pleads not
guilty. Justice Rosellini therefore concluded that the legislature intended
RCW chapter 10.94 to allow the prosecuting attorney to seek the death
penalty in all cases of aggravated first degree murder. 53 Despite the legislature's failure explicitly to require a special sentencing procedure in all
capital cases, Justice Rosellini stated that the conclusion that the death
penalty applies if a defendant pleads guilty is "inescapable if the language is given its fair import." 54 Further, he reminded the court of its
duty to construe ambiguous statutes to favor a construction preserving the
55
constitutionality of the statute over one rendering it invalid.
B.

State v. Frampton

The majority's interpretation of RCW chapter 10.94 in Martin resulted
in an inequitable sentencing scheme. A defendant pleading guilty to first
degree murder faced a maximum penalty of life with the possibility of
parole, while a defendant choosing to go to trial faced the possibility of
death. Eight defendants challenged the constitutionality of this sentencing
scheme in State v. Frampton.56 Five of the defendants had been convicted
58
57
and sentenced to death under RCW chapter 10.94. A divided court
reaffirmed Martin and invalidated the death penalty statute. As a result,
none of the defendants received a sentence more severe than life with the
59
possibility of release or parole.

52. The Washington Legislature did, in fact, recognize that Martin left chapter 10.94 constitutionally infirm. See note 160 and accompanying text infra.
53. 94 Wn. 2d at 27, 614 P.2d at 177 (dissenting opinion).
54. Id.
55. Id.; see Woodson v. State, 95 Wn. 2d 257, 261, 623 P.2d 683, 685 (1980); Anderson v.
Morris, 87 Wn. 2d 706, 716, 558 P.2d 155, 161 (1976); see also Hart v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 91
Wn.2d 197, 203, 588 P.2d 204, 208 (1978) (stating that a statute susceptible of two interpretations
should be construed in the manner which best advances the overall legislative purpose).
56. 95 Wn. 2d 469, 627 P.2d 922 (1981). Although a number of other issues pertaining to capital
punishment were before the court, this Comment discusses only the constitutionality of the statute.
57. Id. at 472, 627 P.2d at 923. A sixth defendant had been sentenced to life without the possibility of release or parole because his sentencing jury was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
there were not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency as required under RCW chapter
10.94. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.94.020(8) (1980) (repealed 1981); see note 28 supra (text of
statute). Two additional defendants were before the court on interlocutory appeals because of confused trial court rulings that had followed Martin regarding the status of RCW chapter 10.94.
58. Justices Rosellini, Dore, Dimmick, and Hicks were in favor of overruling the court's earlier
decision in Martin. 95 Wn. 2d at 503,528, 627 P.2d at 939, 952.
59. Id. at 484,627 P.2d at 929.
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Sentencing Under Chapter10.94

In Frampton the court reaffirmed its holding in Martin that, under the
sentencing procedures of RCW chapter 10.94, a defendant who pleads
guilty to first degree murder avoids the possible imposition of the death
penalty, unlike a defendant who is convicted in a jury trial. Writing for
the plurality, Justice Dolliver concluded that this sentencing scheme was
unconstitutional. 60 Under United States v. Jackson,6' this scheme places
an impermissible burden on a capital defendant's right to a jury trial. 62
Justice Dolliver, in reaffirming Martin, rejected the state's contention
that RCW § 10.49.010,63 which provided for impaneling a sentencing
jury after a guilty plea, should be construed in pari materia 64 with RCW §
10.94.020,65 which provided for impaneling a sentencing jury after a jury
verdict. He concluded that RCW § 10.49.010 was relevant only to the
first degree murder sentencing scheme in existence before the legislative
enactments of 1975 and 1977 that resulted in RCW chapter 10.94.66 He
rejected the contention that the legislature intended the provisions to be
read together without expressly stating so. 67 He concluded that the connection between RCW § 10.49.010 and RCW § 10.94.020 was too tenuous in light of the judiciary's traditional adherence to all safeguards when
68
a defendant's life is at stake.
The plurality adopted the analysis in Justice Horowitz's special concurrence in Martin, which had concluded from the legislative history of the
1977 death penalty bill that the legislature had overlooked the pleading
problem. 69 Justice Horowitz had reached this conclusion because the
60. Id. at 483, 627 P.2d at 929.
61. 390 U.S. 570(1968).
62. At issue in Jackson was the constitutionality of the Federal Kidnaping Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1201(a) (1966). Like RCW chapter 10.94, that Act provided no explicit procedure for imposing the
death penalty upon a defendant pleading guilty to the crime but did provide the death penalty for a
defendant adjudged guilty by a jury verdict. Because of the impermissible burden placed on a defendant's right to a trial by jury, the Court invalidated the sentencing provision of the Act. 390 U.S. at
572.
63. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.49.010 (1980) (repealed 1981); see note 7 supra (text of statute).
64. See generally notes 112-13 and accompanying text infra (discussing the in pari materia rule
of construction).
65. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.94.020 (1980) (repealed 1981); see note 26 supra (text of
statute).
66. 95 Wn. 2d at 475, 627 P.2d at 925. According to Justice Dolliver, the sentencing scheme
prior to the enactment of RCW chapter 10.94 provided for jury determination of the degree of murder
and the punishment to be imposed, regardless of whether a defendant pleaded guilty or not guilty. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 478, 627 P.2d at 926. Justice Horowitz had made this same argument in Martin, 94
Wn. 2d at 21, 614 P.2d at 174 (concurring opinion).
69. Frampton, 95 Wn. 2d at 476-78, 627 P.2d at 925-26. The validity of this conclusion is
undermined by the number of drafts of death penalty legislation presented to the Washington Legisla-

The Death Penalty in Washington
original bill had included a provision for impaneling a jury in the event of
a guilty plea that was excluded in the final version. 70 Justice Dolliver rejected the possibility that the legislature was aware of RCW § 10.49.010
and thus purposely deleted the provision in RCW chapter 10.94. Justice
Dolliver also rejected the state's argument that RCW chapter 10.94 required a jury trial in every capital case. He left this policy choice to the
legislature. 7 1 In doing so, he followed Jackson, in which the United
States Supreme Court had expressed its disapproval of mandatory jury
trials on the issue of guilt. Under the Court's construction of the Federal
Kidnaping Act in Jackson, only those defendants electing to go to trial
faced the possibility of the death penalty. 72 The government had-urged
the Court to instruct federal judges not to allow defendants in kidnaping
cases to waive jury trials or plead guilty so that all defendants would face
the possibility of death. The Court rejected this request for mandatory
jury trials although criminal defendants have no absolute right to have
their guilty pleas accepted. The Court found that requiring a defendant to
submit to a "full-dress jury trial as a matter of course" 73 would have a
cruel effect upon defendants preferring not to contest their guilt and
would rob the criminal process of much of its flexibility. 74
In his Frampton dissent, Justice Rosellini asserted that the Martin
court's misconstruction of the aggravated murder statute thwarted the legislature's intention to require a jury trial in every capital case. 75 He noted
that this construction opposed the will of the people and of the legislature
and ignored fundamental principles of statutory construction. 76 He asserted that Criminal Rule 4.2(a), listing permissible pleas, which the
Martin court had construed to require the court to accept a murder defendant's guilty plea, 77 should be read as a unified whole with statutory provisions governing criminal procedure, that is, in pan materia. 78 So conture during the 1977 session, a large number of which included provisions addressing the pleading
situation. See, e.g., H.B. No. 184, 45th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1977); S.B. No. 2001, 45th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1977); H.B. No. 1160, 45th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1977); and H.B. No. 1358, 45th Leg., Reg.

Sess. (1977).
70. Martin, 94 Wn. 2d at 19, 614 P.2d at 173.
71. 95 Wn. 2d at 479, 627 P.2d at 927.
72. See note 62 supra.
73. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 584 (1968).
74. Id.
75. 95 Wn. 2d at 500, 627 P.2d at 938.
76. Id. at 502, 627 P.2d at 939.
77. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
78. 95 Wn. 2d at 504-05, 627 P.2d at 939; cf. City of Seattle v. State, 54 Wn. 2d 139, 146, 338
P.2d 126, 130 (1959) (stating that "statutes in pari materia should be construed together and effect
given to both"); State v. Houck, 32 Wn. 2d 681, 684, 203 P.2d 693, 695 (1949) (same). See generally text accompanying notes 121-122 infra (discussing the in pari materia rule of construction).
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strued, he found a legislative intent to require jury trials in all capital
79
cases.
Justice Rosellini found no inconsistency between Rule 4.2 and the statutory requirement for a jury trial in every capital case. He reasoned that
Rule 4.2 merely delineates permissible pleas rather than limiting the legislature's power to require a jury trial for particular crimes. 80
In a separate dissent, Justice Dore challenged the plurality's reliance
upon the legislative history of House Bill No. 615, the predecessor bill of
RCW chapter 10.94.81 The plurality concluded from the legislative history that the legislature did not intend the special sentencing provisions of
RCW chapter 10.94 to apply when defendants pleaded guilty to first degree murder because earlier drafts of the bill included a provision for imposing the death penalty upon such defendants which was omitted from
the final version. 82 Justice Dore had two objections to this conclusion.
First he objected to the plurality's reliance on the printed versions of the
progressive drafts of the bill. 83 He did not believe that these materials
79. 95 Wn. 2d at 509, 627 P.2d at 942-43. Justice Rosellini noted that the court had never
suggested that Rule 4.2(a) superseded the other statutes in effect on its adoption. Id. Implied repeals
are disfavored in Washington law. Jenkins v. State, 85 Wn. 2d 883, 886, 540 P.2d 1363. 1365
(1975).
Justice Utter, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that article 2. § 37 of the Washington constitution prevents an in pari materia reading of RCW chapter 10.94 and RCW § 10.49.010. 95
Wn. 2d at 519, 627 P.2d at 947. This constitutional provision requires any act revising or amending
another act to include at full length the revised or amended provision. By this provision, any new
legislative enactment must be complete in itself or it must indicate how it is related to the provision it
alters. Justice Utter determined that the dissent's argument for a reading in pari materia is a concession that the two statutes were interdependent, and as such, RCW chapter 10.94 amended RCW §
10.49.010. Id. Because the text of the death penalty statute nowhere sets forth the text of RCW §
10.49.010, the later provision was an invalid attempt under the constitution to amend the earlier
statute.
This argument can be refuted on a number of grounds. First, the death penalty is complete in itself
and reference to any other statute is not required in order to determine the special sentencing procedures. Second, RCW chapter 10.94 does not alter the scope or effect of RCW § 10.49.010. Third.
adoption of Justice Utter's analysis would obliterate the in pan materia rule of construction in Washington. Article 2, § 37 of the Washington constitution had never been read to effect such an abrogation. See Weyerhaeuser v. King County, 91 Wn. 2d 721, 731, 592 P.2d 1108, 1114 (1979) (stating
the test as whether an act changes a prior act in scope and effect).
80. 95 Wn. 2d at 510,627 P.2d at 943.
81. Id. at 521,627 P.2d at 948-50 (opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part).
82. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
83. 95 Wn. 2d at 523, 627 P.2d at 949-50. Justice Horowitz had reached the conclusion in
Martin that this omission indicated the legislature's intention that the special sentencing procedures
would not apply to a defendant pleading guilty to first degree murder. 94 Wn. 2d 1, 19, 614 P.2d at
173 (concurring opinion). He noted an original version of the bill, subsequently eliminated, which
contained a specific provision relating to guilty pleas: "If the trial jury has been waived, or if the
defendant pleaded guilty to murder in the first degree, the death penalty proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose and such jury cannot be waived." Id. (quoting Wash.
H.R. 615, 45th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1977)). The majority adopted this analysis in Frampton. 95 Wn. 2d
at 476-78, 627 P.2d at 925-26.
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constituted conclusive evidence of legislative intent, 84 especially when an
omission in a later draft of a bill was involved. 85 Even if reliance on the
successive drafts was proper, Justice Dore- objected to the conclusion
reached by the plurality. He observed that several inferences could be
drawn from the exclusion of the sentencing provision: the omission may
have been inadvertent; the provision may have seemed superfluous in
light of RCW § 10.49.010; or the legislature may have meant to radically
change existing law to allow all defendants pleading guilty to avoid the
death penalty. 86 Justice Dore asserted that in light of these equally tenable
alternative explanations, the challengers of the statute failed to prove
"beyond a reasonable doubt" 87 that the omission was the consequence of
the third alternative. In other words, he argued that the omission was not
a purposeful act by the legislature to allow defendants pleading guilty to
88
escape the death penalty.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS
The Right to PleadGuilty

In Martin, the Washington Supreme Court held that Criminal Rule
4.2(a) conferred the right to plead guilty upon defendants charged with
first degree murder. 89 Whether this conclusion was correct depends upon
whether Rule 4.2(a) is characterized as procedural or substantive. 90
84. 95 Wn. 2d at 523, 627 P.2d at 950 (citing Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85
Wn. 2d 441,536 P.2d 157 (1975)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 523-24.
87. Id. at 524, 627 P.2d at 950. The Washington courts have indicated that the burden to prove a
statute unconstitutional is on the challenger, and that the burden is a heavy one. Justice Dore's standard was derived from Sator v. Department of Revenue, 89 Wn. 2d 338, 572 P.2d 1094 (1977), in
which the court held that the party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 346, 572 P.2d at 1098; see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Washington Life & Disability Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, 83 Wn. 2d 523, 528, 520 P.2d 162, 166 (1974);
Hoppe v. State, 78 Wn. 2d 164, 169, 469 P.2d 909, 913 (1970); State v. Primeau, 70 Wn. 2d 109,
111, 422 P.2d 302, 304 (1966). But see Louthan v. King County, 94 Wn. 2d 422, 428, 617 P.2d
977, 981 (1980) (burden of showing ordinance unconstitutional rests "heavily" on the challenger).
Apparently, the favored definition of the standard is the "beyond a reasonable doubt" description
used by Justice Dore. See In re Marriage of Johnson, 96 Wn. 2d 255, 258, 634 P.2d 877, 879 (1981)
(the court's most recent statement on the burden).
88. Justices Dimmick and Hicks concurred in the dissents of Justices Rosellini and Dore, favoring the overruling of State v. Martin and the preservation of RCW chapter 10.94. 95 Wn. 2d at
528-30, 627 P.2d at 952-53.
89. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
90. There is also an issue whether Rule 4.2(a) was impliedly overruled by RCW chapter 10.94.
Implied repeals are disfavored in Washington. Jenkins v. State, 85 Wn. 2d 883, 886, 540 P.2d 1363,
1365 (1975). Implied repeals may be effected, however, if a later enactment cannot be reconciled
with an earlier one. State v. Ensminger, 77 Wn. 2d 535, 540, 463 P.2d 612, 616 (1970); State v.
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The supreme court is authorized to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure. 9 1 Procedural rules pertain to essentially mechanical
operations of the courts. 92 When such rules are adopted by the supreme
court they have the effect of law 93 and they invalidate prior inconsistent
95
legislation. 94 The court cannot, however, promulgate substantive rules,
96
that is, rules that create, define, or regulate primary rights.
The power to prescribe the form, kind, and character of court pleadings
does not, of itself, include the power to prescribe the situations in which
particular pleas are appropriate. 97 This substantive decision is beyond the
power granted to the court. Despite this limitation, the court found that
Rule 4.2(a) established a substantive right for criminal defendants: the
right to plead guilty to first degree murder. If Rule 4.2(a) established a
right to plead guilty, the court improperly engaged in substantive
lawmaking when it adopted the rule.
Justice Rosellini in his Martin dissent interpreted Rule 4.2(a) as a list
of the pleas generally available at arraignment, rather than as a legal mandate of the circumstances in which a defendant can plead guilty. 98 This
construction would have preserved the validity of Rule 4.2(a) as a
procedural rule in noncapital cases, while allowing the provisions of
RCW chapter 10.94 and RCW § 10.49.010 to govern pleading in capital
cases.
Under this interpretation, two possible procedures for a capital defendant pleading guilty could have been derived from RCW chapter 10.94
Cross, 22 Wn. 2d 402, 156 P.2d 416 (1945). Rule 4.2(a) and RCW chapter 10.94 are not clearly
irreconcilable. It is thus more persuasive to argue that Rule 4.2(a) is limited by reading it in pari
materia with other laws than to argue that RCW chapter 10.94 impliedly repealed the rule. See generally text accompanying notes 121-22 infra (discussing the in pari materia rule of construction).
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.190 (1981). In addition to this statutory power, the court has inherent rulemaking power under article 4, § I of the Washington Constitution. State v. Fields. 85 Wn. 2d
126, 129, 530 P.2d 284, 286 (1975); see also State v. Smith, 84 Wn. 2d 498, 501, 502, 527 P.2d
674, 676-77 (1974) (stating that rulemaking is an inherent attribute of the court and an integral part
of the judicial process); Emwright v. King County, 96 Wn. 2d 538, 543, 637 P.2d 656, 659 (1981)
(same).
92. State v. Smith, 84 Wn. 2d 498, 501-02, 527 P.2d 674, 676-77 (1974) (setting forth guidelines for distinguishing procedural and substantive areas).
'93. WASH. REv.CODE § 2.04.190 (1981).
94. See note 9 supra.
95. State v. Fields, 85 Wn. 2d 126, 530 P.2d 284 (1975). Whether proceeding under statutory or
inherent rulemaking authority, the court must still determine whether the subject matter involved is
procedural or substantive. "If it is substantive law, it is beyond our authority." Id. at 129, 530 P.2d
at 286; see also Emwright v. King County, 96 Wn. 2d 538, 543, 637 P.2d 656. 659 (1981) (same).
96. State v. Smith, 84 Wn. 2d 498, 501,527 P.2d 674, 676-77 (1974).
97. Justice Rosellini raised this point in his Martin dissent, arguing that Rule 4.2(a) merely lists
the kinds of pleas appropriate at arraignment. 94 Wn. 2d at 28, 614 P.2d at 177.
98. 94 Wn. 2d at 28, 614 P.2d at 177. Justice Rosellini added: "In passing I should say that I
find it bizarre that a court rule should be utilized to aid a statutory construction which renders an act
unconstitutional." Id.
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and RCW § 10.49.010. Either alternative would have preserved the constitutionality of RCW chapter 10.94. First, the provisions of RCW chapter 10.94 read alone would have required a jury trial in all capital cases,
altogether precluding the defendant from pleading guilty. 99 This alterna0 in which the United States
tive is supported by Corbitt v. New Jersey,10
Supreme Court held that the federal government and the states are free to
abolish guilty pleas and plea bargaining. This alternative would conflict
with the Washington court's disapproval of mandatory jury trials, 101 how02
ever, and would mark a radical change in Washington practice. 1
The second alternative would have been to allow a capital defendant to
plead guilty and then impose a mandatory sentencing trial under RCW §
10.49.010. Every capital defendant pleading guilty would face ajury trial
determining the degree of murder and the penalty to be imposed. The
procedure of the sentencing trial would be governed by RCW chapter
10.94.
Requiring all capital defendants to submit to a sentencing trial would
also conflict with the Washington court's policy against mandatory jury
trials. 103 Nevertheless, this result cannot be avoided if the death penalty is
to be imposed. The United States Supreme Court has determined that the
eighth amendment to the United States Constitution' 0 4 requires that a jury
consider the circumstances surrounding the case, as well as the individual
characteristics of the defendant, before the jury can impose the death penalty. 105 The hardship caused by a jury trial is minimized by allowing a
capital defendant to plead guilty, which eliminates a trial on the issue of
guilt.
B.

The Sentencing Scheme

Construing Rule 4.2(a) in conjunction with RCW chapter 10.94, RCW
§ 10.49.010, and other statutory provisions governing criminal procedure 06 would have resulted in a comprehensive sentencing scheme for
aggravated first degree murder. The scheme would have required impaneling a jury following a guilty plea (pursuant to RCW § 10.49.010) for a
99. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
100. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
101. See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra.
102. State v. Martin, 94 Wn. 2d at 15, 614 P.2d at 171 (Horowitz, J., specially concurring).
103. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
104. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
105. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
106. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9A.32 (1981) (Homicide); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.060
(1981); see note 42 supra (text of statute).
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special sentencing proceeding (under RCW §§ 10.94.020(1) and (2)).
That special sentencing jury would deliberate (under RCW §§
10.94.020(3) through (10)), answer the special questions of RCW §
10.94.020(10) regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and
determine whether to impose the death penalty. This scheme would have
encompassed those situations in which a defendant elects to go to trial as
well as those in which a defendant chooses to plead guilty. The maximum
possible penalty is identical in each case. In addition, this conclusion is
consistent with the state's historical treatment of defendants who plead
guilty to charges of first degree murder. 107
The SignificanceofRCW § 10.49.010

1.

The Martin court determined that no procedure existed for imposing
the death penalty on a capital defendant who pleaded guilty. 108 This holding was reaffirmed in Frampton.10 9 Both decisions failed to acknowledge
the validity of RCW § 10.49.010,110 which provides for impaneling a
special sentencing jury if a defendant pleads guilty to murder.
RCW § 10.49.010 had remained in effect since its enactment in
1854.111 In In re Brandon v. Webb, 112 the supreme court recognized the
applicability of this statute to cases in which the jury was given a choice
of sentences. When Brandon was decided, a jury in a first degree murder
case was required to determine whether the penalty would be life imprisonment or death. 1 3 Because sentencing for all other crimes was performed by the court, the supreme court in Brandon concluded that RCW
§ 10.49.010 applied only to first degree murder. 114
The statute never was altered after Brandon and was not expressly
repealed when the legislature adopted chapter 10.94 in 1977. The legislature, however, did expressly repeal RCW § 10.49.010 in April, 1981.115
Before 1977, neither the court nor the legislature had indicated that the
statute was any less effective than it had been when it was adopted. Had
107.

See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra. Further, the 1981 death penalty legislation re-

quiring a sentencing trial if a capital defendant pleads guilty demonstrates the continuing state policy
that the death penalty apply to all defendants charged with aggravated first degree murder regardless
of their pleas. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.050(4).

108.

94 Wn. 2d at 8-9, 614 P.2d at 167-68.

109.
110.

95 Wn. 2d 469, 627 P.2d 922 (1981).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.49.010 (1980) (repealed 1981); see note 7 supra (text of

statute).
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
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ActofApr. 28, 1854, § 87, 1854Wash. Laws 100. 115.
23Wn. 2d 155, 160P.2d529(1945).
See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
23 Wn. 2d at 166-67, 160 P.2d at 534-35.
Act of May 14, 1981, ch. 138, § 24(4), 1981 Wash. Laws 535, 546.
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the legislature intended to repeal this statute at an earlier date or to make it
inapplicable to RCW chapter 10.94, the legislature would have made that
intention clear, as it did in April, 1981. The legislature may be presumed
to intend that enactments not repealed be given full effect. 116
The existence of RCW § 10.49.010 explains why the legislature
adopted the 1977 death penalty statute without providing a specific procedure to be followed when a capital defendant pleads guilty. 117 Because
the legislature is presumed to be aware of the state of the law, 1 18 it may
have eliminated an extraneous provision in RCW chapter 10.94 because
RCW § 10.49.010 already provided the procedure.
Reading RCW § 10.49.010 in conjunction with RCW chapter 10.94
would have provided a complete procedure for sentencing defendants
convicted of aggravated first degree murder. RCW chapter 10.94 applied
in all cases in which the prosecuting attorney had filed notice of intent to
seek the death penalty: directly, in the case of a jury verdict; and indirectly through RCW § 10.49.010, in the event of a guilty plea. Had the
court- recognized the validity of RCW § 10.49.010, it would not have
found it necessary to invalidate the 1977 death penalty statute.
2.

Principlesof Statutory Construction

In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court should be guided by
several rules of statutory construction. The rules apply only if the statute
is ambiguous. The paramount objective of all rules of construction is to
ascertain the legislature's intent and, where possible, to effectuate that
intent.1 19 Four such rules of construction are relevant to the present discussion.
First, whenever a statute may be interpreted in more than one way, the
court should favor the construction that preserves its constitutionality
over one that renders it invalid. 12 0
116. Olympia State Bank & Trust Co. v. Craft, 56 Wn. 2d 546, 548-49, 354 P.2d 386, 387
(1960); 73 AM. JuR. 2d Statutes § 253, at 424-25 (1974).
117. In Martin, Justice Horowitz contended that the omission of a provision for impaneling a
jury in the event of a guilty plea meant that the legislature did not intend to allow a special sentencing
trial when defendants pleaded guilty to first degree murder. An equally tenable explanation for the
omission is that the legislature purposefully omitted the provision because of the existence of RCW §
10.49.010.
118. Seenote51 supra.
119. "In interpreting a statute, it is the duty of the court to ascertain and give effect to the intent
and purpose of the legislature, as expressed in the act." Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Johnson, 89
Wn. 2d 321, 326, 572 P.2d 1085, 1088 (1977); see also State v. Rinkes, 49 Wn. 2d 664, 667, 306
P.2d 205, 207 (1957); State v. Cain, 28 Wash. App. 462, 464, 624 P.2d 732, 733 (1981).
120. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
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Second, statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in
conjunction-that is, in pari materia-and effect given to each of
them. 121 Statutes relating to the same person, thing, class of persons or
things, or to the same subject, are in pai materia. The in pari materia rule
of construction requires that all such statutes be construed together, the
object of the rule being to ascertain the legislative intent underlying the
entire statutory scheme by reading the provisions as a unified, harmoni22
ous whole. 1
Third, penal statutes should be construed against the state to give the
benefit of any doubt to the defendant. 123
Fourth, underlying the construction of any statute is a strong presumption that the legislation is constitutional, 24 and a heavy burden rests on
the party asserting its invalidity. In Washington, this burden has been de25
scribed as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 1
These rules of construction dictate that RCW chapter 10.94, RCW §
10.94.010, and Rule 4.2(a) be read in pari materia to require that a court
impanel a special sentencing jury after a capital defendant has entered a
guilty plea. This construction would have preserved the constitutionality
of the death penalty statute while effectuating the intent of the legislature.
A further rule aiding this construction is that the legislature is presumed
to be aware of the state of the law. 126 Under this presumption, the legislature must be credited with the knowledge that allowing a defendant to
avoid the death penalty by pleading guilty would violate the constitutional
principles enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson.
Language in the Jackson decision supports the use of RCW §
10.49.010 to validate the death penalty statute. In construing a sentencing
scheme closely similar to RCW chapter 10.94,127 the Supreme Court
noted that, had the power to impanel a special sentencing jury been recognized elsewhere in the federal system at the time the Act was adopted, it
may have considered the omission of a similar provision in the Act itself
to be a tacit incorporation of the existing sentencing procedure.1 28 In
Washington, a separate sentencing statute providing for impaneling a spe121 .

See note 78 and accompanying text supra.

122. State v. Williams, 94Wn. 2d531,617 P.2d 1012 (1981).
123. State v. Thompson, 38 Wn. 2d 774, 232 P.2d 87 (1951); State v. Cain, 28 Wash. App. 462,
624 P.2d 732 (1981).

124.

Louthan v. King County, 94 Wn. 2d 422, 617 P.2d 977 (1980); Sator v. Dept. of Revenue,

89 Wn. 2d 338, 572 P.2d 1094 (1977).
125. See note 79 supra.
126. State v. Houck, 32 Wn. 2d 681, 684, 203 P.2d 693, 695 (1949); In re Sage, 21 Wash. App.
803, 808, 586 P.2d 1201 (1978).

127. This scheme was enacted by Congress as part of the Federal Kidnaping Act. See generally
note 62 supra (discussing Jackson).
128. 390 U.S. at 578.
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cial sentencing jury did exist. Consistent with the Jackson dictum, therefore, the Washington court could have assumed that RCW § 10.49.010
had been tacitly incorporated into the death penalty statute.
In both Martin and Frampton the Washington court asserted that the
uniqueness of the death penalty operated to displace application of the
usual rules of statutory construction. 129 The court cited no authority for
this proposition. In Frampton, Justice Utter, concurring, 130 attempted to
support this proposition reasoning by analogy to the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Woodson v. North Carolina1 31 and Lockett v.
Ohio. 132 This analogy is not convincing.
Neither Woodson nor Lockett involved statutory construction. Both
cases dealt with the constitutionality of death penalty legislation that did
not allow a sentencing jury to consider the character and record of the
defendant or the circumstances of the offense. Because the death penalty
is qualitatively different from imprisonment, the Court held that the jury
must consider these individualized factors before imposing the death penalty. 133 These cases, although standing for the proposition that the death
penalty is qualitatively unique, do not stand for the proposition that general principles of statutory construction should be ignored when a court
construes a death penalty statute.
In concluding that RCW chapter 10.94 was inapplicable to defendants
pleading guilty to first degree murder, the Martin majority relied on the
language of RCW § 10.94.020(2), which provided for reconvening the
"same trial jury" to determine the penalty issue if the jury had returned a
guilty verdict. 134 As noted by Justice Rosellini in his dissenting opinion, 135 RCW § 10.94.010 does not restrict the death penalty to those
cases in which the defendant has pleaded not guilty. The dissent's interpretation focused on the entire act, applied the in pan materia rule, and
harmonized all of the relevant statutes. 136 This interpretation diminishes
any controlling impact that the "same trial jury" language might have
because RCW § 10.94.020(1) provides for the special sentencing proceeding whenever a defendant is "found" guilty of murder in the first
degree. Washington's supreme court has long recognized that a guilty
plea is the functional equivalent of a guilty verdict. 137
129. Martin, 94 Wn. 2d at 21, 614 P.2d at 174; Frampton, 95 Wn. 2d at 518, 627 P.2d at 947.
130. 95 Wn. 2d at 518, 627 P.2d at 947.
131. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
132. 438 U.S. 586(1978).
133. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
134. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.94.020(2) (1980) (repealed 1981).
135. 94 Wn. 2d at 30, 614 P.2d at 178-79.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., In re Brandon v. Webb, 23 Wn. 2d 155, 159, 160 P.2d 529, 531 (1945).
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Although penal statutes must be strictly construed, the court should

still apply all other applicable rules of statutory construction. The controlling factor in the interpretation of all statutes, including penal statutes, is
legislative intent. 138 Strict constructions should not be allowed to defeat
39
the policy and purposes of valid legislation. 1

3.

LegislativeHistory

In Frampton,the plurality adopted Justice Horowitz's analysis in Martin, which relied on sequential drafts of the original 1977 death penalty
bill to conclude that the legislature intended to omit a capital sentencing
procedure for defendants pleading guilty. 140 The court's reliance on the
successive drafts was misplaced. 141
In Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines HearingsBoard,142 the Washington
Supreme Court questioned the use of successive legislative drafts in construing the meaning of a statute. The court concluded that the assumption
that each subsequent draft of a bill takes into consideration the language
of each preceding draft ignores the reality and imprecision of the legislative process. 143 Courts and legal scholars discourage over-reliance on
successive drafts as an absolute tool of construction. 44 In Hama Hama,

the court found that the process may be useful in "appropriate circumstances," 145 but should not be considered conclusive.
In Martin, Justice Horowitz cited Hama Hama for the proposition that
the procedure was valid, asserting that the Martin case was an "appropriate circumstance." 146 The court in Hama Hama, however, had concluded
that, unless legislative history explains the changes, "it is not a proper
judicial function for the court to speculate and attribute controlling meaning to an unexplained change that is just as likely to have occurred
138.

See, e.g.,3 J.SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION § 59.06 (C. Sands

4th ed. 1974); 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 300, at 456 (1974).
139. See, e.g., 3 J.SUTHERLAND, supra note 138, at § 59.06.
140. See notes 69-72 and accompanying text supra.
141. The court recently interpreted an omission in a subsequent draft of a bill as an intentional act
in State v.Cleppe, 96 Wn. 2d 373, 635 P.2d 435 (1981). At issue was the meaning of the legislature's omission of "knowingly" and "intentionally" as elements in the felony of simple possession
of a controlled substance. The court concluded that the legislature would have included the words as
elements had it intended them to constitute a part of the crime. Id. at 379. This is distinguishable from
the present case in that the legislature there adopted the new Uniform Controlled Substances Act. The
legislature in defining the crime of simple possession was not working with an existing statute such as
RCW § 10.49.0 10, which provided supplementary information on the law involved.
142. 85 Wn. 2d 441, 536 P.2d 157 (1975).
143. Id. at 449-50,536 P.2d at 162.
144. See, e.g., 2A SUTHERLAND, supranote 138, at § 48.18.
145. 85 Wn. 2d at 450.
146. 94 Wn. 2d at 19, 614 P.2d at 173 (Horowitz, J.,
concurring).
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through happenstance." 1 47 As noted by Justice Dore in his Frampton dissent, there is no explanatory legislative history in this case and there are a
number of equally plausible explanations for the legislature's omission in
RCW chapter 10.94 of an explicit provision for imposing the death pen8
alty on capital defendants who plead guilty. 14
In the presence of alternative explanations for the omission, the established rules of construction obligated the court to adopt that explanation
which would have preserved the constitutionality of the statute. Because
of these plausible alternative explanations, the defendants challenging the
validity of the statute did not prove the unconstitutionality of the statute
49
beyond a reasonable doubt. 1
4. A ProcedureConsistentwith Washington History
Had the Martin majority used RCW § 10.49.010 to fill the alleged gap
in the death penalty sentencing procedures, it would not have been the
court's first acknowledgment of separate sentencing trials. Since 1854,
Washington juries have been deciding the penalty to be imposed for murder independently of determining the guilt of the defendant.150 Before
1975, only a jury could impose the death penalty by returning a special
verdict at trial or by a special sentencing trial in the event of a guilty
plea. 151
Further, despite the absence of an explicit statutory provision, the court
has recognized the need for a jury trial on the issue of punishment alone.
In State v. Todd, 152 the court interpreted RCW § 10.49.010 to allow, by
implication, a separate trial on the question whether to impose the death
penalty. The court in Todd was considering a conviction for first degree
murder. The only error the court found related to the sentence imposed.
The court ordered a new trial solely on the issue of punishment. The court
acknowledged that no statute authorized a bifurcated penalty trial after a
jury conviction. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the legislature had
sanctioned such a sentencing trial in the event of a guilty plea under RCW
§ 10.49.010. The court thus implicitly recognized that it could order a
jury trial to impose the death penalty. 153
147. 85 Wn. 2d at 451,536 P.2d at 163.
148. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
149. See note 87 and accompanying text supra (discussion of burden on defendant challenging
constitutionality of statute).
150. See notes 13-23 and accompanying text supra.
151. See id.
152. 78 Wn. 2d 362,474 P.2d 542(1970).
153. Id. at377,474P.2dat551.

545

Washington Law Review

Vol. 57:525, 1982

In In re Hawkins v. Rhay, 154 the court again ordered a trial solely on
the issue of punishment. In Hawkins, the defendant was convicted of first
degree murder and was sentenced to death. The defendant appealed only
the imposition of the death penalty. Citing Todd, the court ordered a new
penalty trial 155 notwithstanding the absence of a statute authorizing this
procedure.
Although these cases pre-date the 1977 death penalty statute, they indicate the court's willingness to recognize the appropriateness of separate
sentencing trials as implicitly authorized by RCW § 10.49.010. Because
the court could imply from RCW § 10.49.010 that a separate sentencing
trial is proper when a defendant convicted by a jury challenges a sentence, it could certainly have found that a separate sentencing trial was
appropriate in Martin, a case clearly falling within the scope of the statute.
Separate sentencing trials are consistent with the state's historical treatment of the jury and of capital punishment. Since 1919, the death penalty
has been imposed in Washington only by a jury, regardless of the plea
entered by the defendant. 156 To construe RCW § 10.49.010 and RCW
chapter 10.94 together would be wholly consistent with prior Washington
practice. The provisions of RCW chapter 10.94 merely expand and delineate the procedures under which the RCW § 10.49.0 10 sentencing jury
would operate.
5.

Policy Considerations

The Washington Supreme Court's decisions in Martin and Frampton
are inconsistent with the express wishes of the people of Washington.
Washington voters overwhelmingly approved capital punishment in a
1975 initiative. 157 The initiative created the classification of aggravated
murder in the first degree, punishable by a mandatory death sentence. 158
When the United States Supreme Court invalidated mandatory death penalty provisions in 1976,159 the legislature developed and adopted the detailed sentencing procedures of RCW chapter 10.94 in 1977.
154. 78 Wn. 2d 389, 474 P.2d 557 (1970).
155. The defendant had challenged only the selection of his jury under Witherspoon v. Illinois.
391 U.S. 510 (1968). The Washington Supreme Court agreed that Witherspoon compelled vacation
of the death sentence, concluding that eight jurors were improperly excused for cause to the detriment
of the defendant's constitutional rights. The jurors were disqualified without a dialogue establishing
that each juror's opposition to the death penalty would preclude that juror from making an impartial
determination upon the issue of guilt. 78 Wn. 2d at 397, 474 P.2d at 563.
156. See notes 13-23 and accompanying text supra.
157. See note 4 supra.
158. See id.
159. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); see text accompanying note 133 supra.
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The legislature recognized the constitutional infirmity of RCW chapter
10.94 that resulted from the Martin interpretation and introduced replacement legislation in both houses several months before Framptonwas decided. 160 By refusing to overrule Martin, the court thus thwarted the
wishes of the voting public and caused an unnecessary expenditure of
legislative time and energy in drafting replacement legislation.
Perhaps the single most significant consequence of Frampton in the
mind of the public was the reduced sentences given to the nine defendants
charged with aggravated first degree murder under the invalid statute. Defendant Martin, originally charged with two homicides, two attempted
homicides, and eighteen other felonies, escaped the penalties of RCW
chapter 10.94 and received three consecutive life sentences, all with the
possibility of parole. 161 Under RCW chapter 10.94, four defendants in
Framptonhad been sentenced to death and one to life without the possibility of release or parole. 162 The court's decisions reduced the maximum
sentence of each defendant to life with the possibility of release or parole. 163
IV.

WASHINGTON'S NEW CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW

Washington's new capital punishment law, enacted May 14, 1981,164
provides a comprehensive scheme of criminal procedure for the disposition of the crime of aggravated first degree murder. The statute repealed
the 1977 provisions defining the crime and punishment for aggravated
murder in the first degree. 165 The new law is a complete and integrated
statutory procedure regulating the imposition of the death penalty.
The new law is responsive in three ways to the sentencing inequity
resulting from the Martin decision. First, the statute is replete with spe160. Bills introduced to the house and senate before the supreme court decided Frampton include: S.B. No. 3096, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1981); H.B. No. 76,47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1981); and
S.B. No. 3203, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1981).
161. King County Superior Court Judge Norman Quinn sentenced Martin to three consecutive
life terms on Sept. 26, 1980. Judge Quinn stated that Martin was a "lucky man," and that Martin's
case, if any, warranted the death penalty, and recommended that the Board of Prison Terms and
Paroles never let him go free. Lewis, note 32 supraat 23.
162. See note 57 supra(discussion of disposition of other Framptondefendants).
163. Frampton, 95 Wn. 2d at 484, 627 P.2d at 929. The public's outrage at the court's decision
in Martinis indicated by the fact that Chief Justice Utter was challenged in his first contested election
bid in the fall of 1980 by Kitsap County Prosecuting Attorney Dan Clem. Clem claimed that the
challenge was at the request of his community, which was upset at the court's handling of the Martin
case. The Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Aug. 31, 1980, at A-16, col. 1.
164. Act of May 14, 1981, ch. 138, 1981 Wash. Laws 535 (1981) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
ch. 10.95 (1981)).
165. Id. § 24, 1981 Wash. Laws at 546. See generally notes 23-31 and accompanying text supra
(describing the provisions of the 1977 death penalty statute).
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cial provisions that apply to the defendant who pleads guilty. Up to thirty
days after arraignment, the prosecuting attorney may file a written notice
requesting a special sentencing proceeding to consider the death penalty. 166 During this period a defendant may plead guilty only with the
consent of the prosecuting attorney. 167 If the prosecuting attorney correctly files notice, the sentencing proceeding will be held whenever a defendant is adjudged guilty of aggravated first degree murder by plea, jury
verdict, or decision of the court. 168 The defendant cannot avoid the pro69
ceeding by any plea, admission, or agreement. 1
Second, two separate provisions govern the impaneling of the special
sentencing jury following a guilty plea or a jury verdict. If a jury has
returned a guilty verdict, the trial court reconvenes the same jury for the
special sentencing proceeding. 170 If a defendant pleads guilty, the trial
court impanels a twelve-person special sentencing jury to decide the penalty question. 17 ' The procedures of the special sentencing proceeding are
identical whether the defendant is found guilty by jury verdict, court decision, or guilty plea.
Third, the statute provides that no supreme court rule can be construed
to supersede or alter any provision of the chapter. 172 This section bars the
supreme court from using any court rule to frustrate the operation of the
statute and the intention of the legislature. These three provisions demonstate the legislature's determination to preclude defendants charged with
aggravated first degree murder from escaping the possible imposition of
the death penalty by pleading guilty.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Washington death penalty statute, as interpreted by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Martin, placed an impermissible burden on
a capital defendant's right to a trial by jury. In reaching the conclusion
that RCW chapter 10.94 did not apply to capital defendants pleading
guilty, the court rejected the possible constructions of the law that would
have preserved the constitutionality of legislation overwhelmingly supported by Washington voters. The court refused to read as a unified whole
166. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.040 (1981).
167. Id. § 10.95.040(2).
168. Id. § 10.95.050(1).
169. Id.
170. Id. § 10.95.050(3).
171. Id. § 10.95.050(4). This same procedure is followed when there is a decision of the trial
court sitting without a jury, in the event of a retrial of the sentencing, or when an appellate court has
remanded the case for retrial. Id.
172.
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all provisions relevant to the prosecution of those accused of aggravated
first degree murder. Such a reading would have preserved the right of
capital defendants to plead guilty and would have validated an equitable
capital sentencing procedure.
The Washington Supreme Court's refusal in State v. Frampton to reconsider its decision in Martin necessitated both the invalidation of the
1977 death penalty statute and the enactment of replacement legislation.

These decisions at least resulted in a new capital punishment law that
effectuates the will of the people to impose the death penalty in appropri17 3
ate cases.
Leonie G. Heliwig

173. RCW chapter 10.95 is significant not only because of the provisions plugging the Martin
loophole, but also because it allows a convicted defendant to elect against death by hanging. RCW
section 10.95.180(1) allows a defendant the alternative of a "continuous, intravenous administration
of a lethal dose of sodium thiopental," a procedure believed by fiIany to be more humane than death
by hanging. See S.B. No. 3203, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1981) (provided for death by lethal injection
as the primary method of execution). Relatively few states have adopted this procedure and the constitutionality of the process is yet to be established.
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